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Current Trends and Issues in State
Antitrust Enforcement
By Patricia A. Conners*
I. Introduction
It is a very exciting time to be involved in state antitrust
enforcement. While state attorneys general have been consistently
active in the enforcement of the state and federal antitrust laws for
more than twenty years, over the last few years, the focus of the
multistate enforcement effort has become more diverse than ever.
The result has been effective enforcement that has yielded significant
results for consumers. In recent years, state attorneys general have
turned their attention to potential abuses of the antitrust laws within
particular industries, such as the pharmaceuticals, health care, and
telecommunications industries, while continuing their enforcement
efforts with respect to specific violations of the antitrust laws, like
horizontal price-fixing and unlawful vertical pricing restraints. In the
last year, state attorneys general have recovered nearly $400 million
on behalf of consumers and public entities, as either direct or indirect
purchasers, from the settlement of five separate antitrust cases. 1
* This article represents my views as the Chair of the National Association of
Attorneys General ("NAAG") Multistate Antitrust Task Force. My views are my
own and do not necessarily reflect the views of NAAG, the Attorney General for
the State of Florida or any other individual state attorney general. This paper was
originally presented in the form of a speech as part of a panel discussion with state
antitrust enforcers at the Spring Meeting of the American Bar Association's
("ABA") Section of Antitrust Law in April, 2003. The panel discussion was
sponsored by the ABA Section's State Antitrust Enforcement Committee. In being
re-printed for this publication, the speech has been substantially modified,
expanded upon, and where appropriate, updated to better conform it to an article
format. The paper is being re-printed with the permission of the ABA.
New York v. Aventis, MDL No. 1278, No. 01-CV-71835 (E.D. Mich. Jan.
29, 2003) (preliminary approval granted) ($80 million settlement involving the
heart drug, Cardizem); Alabama v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, MDL Nos. 1420 & 1413,
No. 01-Civ. 11401 (JGK) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2003) (preliminary approval granted)
($100 million settlement involving the anti-anxiety drug, BuSpar); Ohio v. Bristol-
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Many of these successes have been enhanced by unprecedented
cooperation between the state attorneys general and federal antitrust
enforcement agencies. Due to the high level of state-federal
cooperation, state attorneys general have also played a significant
role in a number of merger reviews with important local or regional
market implications.
The purpose of this article is to provide some background and
some current information about how state attorneys general work
together to enforce state and federal antitrust laws, discuss some of
the recent developments in state antitrust enforcement, and
demonstrate why state attorneys general remain uniquely qualified to
represent the interests of their consumers and public entities in state
and federal antitrust matters. Specifically, this article will do three
things: (1) give a general overview of the current trends and issues in
state antitrust enforcement; (2) discuss the Multistate Antitrust Task
Force ("Task Force") and some of the ways state enforcement may
differ from federal enforcement in focus, approach, and available
remedies; and (3) provide some practice pointers for defense
attorneys who may find their clients the subject of a multistate
antitrust investigation.
II. Trends and Issues in State Antitrust Enforcement
State attorneys general have been active in antitrust
enforcement in the multistate sense since the early 1980s. In 1983,
the Task Force was established as a permanent subcommittee of the
National Association of Attorneys General ("NAAG") Antitrust
Committee.2 State involvement in antitrust enforcement at that time
can be attributed to at least three factors.
First, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of
1976 ("Hart-Scott-Rodino") 3 provided state attorneys general with
Myers Squibb, Civ. No. 2:02 CV 01080 (EGS) (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 2003)
(preliminary approval granted, Sept. 26, 2003) ($55 million settlement involving
the breast cancer drug, Taxol), available at http://www.abanet.org/
antitrust/committees/state-antitrust/taxol settlement.pdf; New York v. Salton, Inc.,
265 F. Supp. 2d 310, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ($8 million settlement involving George
Foreman grills); In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust
Litigation, No. 1361, 2003 WL 21685581, at *2 (D. Me. July 18, 2003) (approving
$142 million settlement involving compact discs).
2 Report from Officialdom: 60 Minutes with Robert M. Langer, Assistant
Attorney General State of Connecticut, and Chair, NAAG Multistate Antitrust Task
Force, 60 Antitrust L.J. 197, 199 (1991).
' 15 U.S.C.A. § 15(c) (West 1997 and West Supp. 2003).
[Vol. 16: 1
State Antitrust Enforcement
the express statuto7 authority to sue for monetary damages on behalf
of natural persons. The Act was a very important nod by Congress
because there was no antitrust enforcement agency in place looking
after the individual consumer's monetary interest in antitrust cases,
even where the consumer injury was obvious.
Second, at about the same time Hart-Scott-Rodino became
law, Congress amended the Crime Control Act to provide funding for
state antitrust enforcement.5 This measure was an extremely
important development as it provided the seed money for many states
to establish units devoted solely to antitrust enforcement. Without
these funds and the general initiative of the federal government to
foster antitrust enforcement by the states, many state antitrust
enforcement units would never have been formed.
The final factor that contributed to the establishment of the
multistate enforcement effort is the perceived decline during the
Reagan administration of antitrust enforcement by the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") and the United States Department of Justice
Antitrust Division ("DOJ"), the two federal agencies charged with
enforcement of the federal antitrust laws. 6 Once properly funded and
given expanded federal authority, the ability for state attorneys
general to enforce the antitrust laws and fill the gap left by the
reduced federal effort was enhanced. The creation of the Task Force
can primarily be attributed to the convergence of these three events.
With the Task Force established, state attorneys general became more
active than ever, bringing a variety of antitrust enforcement matters.
Action has been taken, both individually and together, having
monetary and non-monetary results.
Task Force enforcement priorities over the years have
generally focused upon such areas as bid-rigging,7 merger challenges,
general conspiracies to restrain trade (both horizontal and vertical)
4 id.
5 See Crime Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-503, § 309, 90 Stat. 2407,
2415 (1976), amended by Act of Dec. 27, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-157, 93 Stat. 1167
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1979)).
6 See William J. Haynes, Jr., Preface to, William J. Haynes Jr., State Antitrust
Laws, pp. vii-ix (1988).
7 Bid-rigging occurs when competing bidders on procurement contracts
conspire in advance of the submission of bids to ensure that a particular bidder or
bidders win(s) the contract or contracts being let for bid at an agreed-upon price or
prices.
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and cases brought on behalf of consumers as indirect purchasers. 8
These cases, all of which have settled either prior to the
commencement of litigation or well before the commencement of
trial, have resolved antitrust allegations against oil companies,
cement makers, agricultural chemical manufacturers, pharmaceutical
companies, shoe manufacturers, appliance and electronics
manufacturers, compact disc distributors, and toy companies, among
others.
Many of these cases have established important precedent for
the special role the state attorneys general play in federal antitrust
enforcement. For example, in the area of merger litigation, California
v. American Stores Co. involved California's challenge to a merger
after the FTC had already, negotiated a remedy as a condition for
approving the transaction. The United States Supreme Court upheld
the state's challenge, finding that Section 16 of the Clayton Act'
°
authorized state attorneys general to pursue injunctive relief even
after the FTC obtained a negotiated consent decree."
In Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, the state
attorneys general again established important precedent in the area of
conspiracies in restraint of trade.' 2 There, nineteen states sued several
of the major domestic insurers, domestic and foreign re-insurers, and
insurance brokers after the DOJ declined a request by the state
attorneys general to investigate an alleged conspiracy between the
companies to boycott general liability insurers and force those
8 Federal law limits the recovery of damages in price-fixing cases only to
those persons who directly purchased the price-fixed product from the company or
companies engaged in the price-fixing. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720,
745-46 (1977). However, at least 23 state attorneys general have authority under
state law, either express or established by case law, to represent consumers who
purchased a price-fixed product indirectly through the chain of distribution from
the company or companies engaged in the price-fixing conspiracy. Statutes
expressly imbuing this authority are known as "indirect purchaser statutes" or
"Illinois Brick repealers." See infra note 25. Where the indirect purchaser authority
has been established through case law, typically state courts have interpreted a
state's deceptive and unfair trade practices act to permit an action on behalf of
indirect purchasers, even where the state antitrust statute is limited to actions by
direct purchasers. See, e.g., Mack v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 673 So. 2d 100, 106
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
9 California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 275-76 (1990).
'0 15 U.S.C.A. §26 (West 1997 and West Supp. 2003).
" American Stores, 495 U.S. at 295-96.
12 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 770 (1993).
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insurers to conform the terms of their domestic commercial general
liability policies to the forms used by the defendants. 13 The alleged
boycott had an adverse impact upon municipalities, because it
effectively foreclosed cities and counties from obtaining beneficial
commercial general liability insurance terms. The case eventually
resulted in a United States Supreme Court decision, re-defining the
antitrust term "group boycott" and establishing the principles of
comity that are the foundation of the federal agencies' efforts against
international cartels today.' 4 The ruling obtained in Hartford is a
prime example of the role state attorneys general often play in
shaping federal antitrust jurisprudence. Had it not been for the
decision of the state attorneys general to pursue this case, after the
federal agencies had declined to pursue it, the two key findings in the
case, that have helped shape subsequent enforcement efforts, would
not have been established.
In California v. ARC America Corp., Alabama, Arizona,
California, and Minnesota, on their own behalf and on behalf of
classes of all governmental entities within each state, sued various
cement producers in federal court, alleging a nationwide conspiracy
to fix cement prices.15 The states sought damages under both federal
and state antitrust laws. 16 After a settlement was obtained with
several of the defendants, the states sought payment out of the
settlement fund for the governmental entities they represented.'
7
However, at least some of the plaintiff public entities were indirect
purchasers of cement products, which meant, pursuant to the earlier
Supreme Court decision of Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 18 they were
not entitled to recover damages under federal antitrust laws. Based on
Illinois Brick, members of the direct purchaser class objected to any
governmental entities that were indirect purchasers participating in
the settlement.' 9 The states argued that the holding in Illinois Brick
did not affect the standing of these indirect purchasers, under each
state's respective antitrust law, to recover all of the overcharges
passed on to them by the direct purchasers of the cement and that, as
"3 Id. at 764.
14 Id. at 798-99, 801-03.
15 California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 97 (1989).
16 Id. at 97-98.
17 Id. at 98-99.
18 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977).
19 ARC America, 490 U.S. at 99.
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a result, they should be permitted to receive payment from the
settlement fund.2 °
After the district court refused to allow the claims 21 and the
22Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, the United States Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the ruling in Illinois Brick limiting
recoveries to direct purchasers did not prevent indirect purchasers of
a price-fixed _product from recovering damages for violations of state
antitrust law.2 The Court concluded that federal antitrust law did not
expressly pre-empt state antitrust law and there was no legislative
intent to occupy the field. 24 This seminal decision became the
impetus for state legislatures around the country to pass so-called
"Illinois Brick repealers" or "indirect purchaser statutes," which
provided state attorneys general with the authority to recover
damages on behalf of consumers and public agencies who were
indirect purchasers of a price-fixed product, even though a similar
cause of action was not available to these purchasers under federal
antitrust laws. 25 The decision also opened the door for plaintiffs to
argue for interpretations of existing state antitrust or consumer
protection laws that were inconsistent with the Illinois Brick
decision.
26
20 Id.
21 See In re Cement and Concrete Antitrust Litigation, No. 296-PHX-MLR,
1985 WL 25742 (D. Ariz. Jan. 23, 1985).
22 See In re Cement and Concrete Antitrust Litigation, 817 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir.
1987).
23 Id. at 100, 105-06.
24 Id. at 105-06.
25 There are at least eighteen states with explicit indirect purchaser statutes:
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16750(a) (enacted in 1978); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-
4509 (1980); HAW. REv. STAT. § 480-14 (enacted in 1987); IDAHO CODE § 48-
108(2) (2000); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/7(2) (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-
161 (enacted in 1985); MD. CODE ANN. COM. LAW § 11-209(b)(2)(ii) (enacted in
1982); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. 10, § 1104 (enacted in 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
445.778(2) (enacted in 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325D.57 (enacted in 1984);
N.Y. GEN. Bus. § 340(6) (enacted in 1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-36-12(g) (1979);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-1-33 (enacted in 1980); VT. STAT. ANN. 9, § 2465(b)
(1999); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 133.18(1)(a) (enacted in 1979). Prior to Illinois Brick,
two states already expressly permitted indirect purchaser suits. ALA. CODE § 6-5-60
(2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-21-9 (2003).
26 See, e.g., Mack v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 673 So. 2d 100, 106 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1996) (interpreting Florida's state consumer protection law to permit
indirect purchasers to sue for damages); Hyde v. Abbott Lab, Inc., 473 S.E.2d 680
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These three cases demonstrate how the efforts of the state
attorneys general, during a time of perceived decline in antitrust
enforcement by the FTC and DOJ, helped shape antitrust
jurisprudence in significant and lasting ways. Today, during a period
of increased federal enforcement activity, state attorneys general
continue to pursue antitrust matters on behalf of consumers and
public entities, an area that remains outside the purview of the federal
enforcement agencies. In particular, state attorneys general continue
to represent their consumers and public agencies in direct and indirect
purchaser actions for violations of state and federal antitrust laws. As
it was twenty years ago, this area remains one that, but for the effort
of the state attorneys general, would likely result in significant under-
representation of consumers (despite the presence of a very active
private class action bar) and virtually no representation of public
entities.
III. State Antitrust Enforcement Today
While the Task Force continues to tackle a number of cases
against a variety of companies engaged in horizontal and vertical
price-fixing conspiracies, it has concentrated on three industries in
particular, getting involved in competition issues arising in these
industries in both the litigation and legislative context: health care,
pharmaceuticals and telecommunications. The multistate effort in
these areas is in addition to the Task Force's continuing pursuit of
egregious price-fixing conduct and vertical restraint cases, together
which remain the "meat and potatoes" of the multistate enforcement
effort. The Task Force's efforts in each of these areas illustrates the
role the state attorneys general typically play to redress harm or
preserve competition, especially with respect to situations not likely
to be addressed by the federal enforcement agencies.
A. The Health Care Industry
Over the years, the health care industry has received more
attention from state antitrust enforcers than any other industry, and it
remains an important enforcement priority today for a number of
(N.C. Ct. App. 1996), discretionary review denied, 478 S.E.2d 5 (N.C. Ct. App.
1996); Blake v. Abbott Labs, Inc., No. 03A01-9509-CV-00307, 1997 WL 134947
(Tenn. Ct. App., Mar. 27, 1996); Blewett v. Abbott Lab., 938 P.2d 842 (Wash.
1997); Bunker's Glass Co. v. Pilkington PIC, 47 P.3d 1119 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002);
Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 646 N.W.2d 440 (Iowa 2002); Ciradi v. Hoffman-
LaRoach, Ltd., 762 N.E.2d 303 (Mass. 2002).
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reasons. Perhaps most important, health care markets are typically
local in nature and therefore, more likely to draw the attention of
state attorneys general. Of course, the increasingly high costs of
health care, health care insurance, and pharmaceuticals also make it a
prime issue of concern for state attorneys general acting on behalf of
consumers. Accordingly, the involvement of state attorneys general
in health care issues has been necessarily diverse. Additionally,
depending on how local the markets are or how widespread the effect
of the conduct, antitrust enforcement efforts in health care may be
pursued by just one attorney general or may be undertaken as a
multistate effort. The fact that a health care initiative may be
undertaken by an individual attorney general alone does not reduce
its significance to the larger multistate enforcement priority of
ensuring competition in the health care industry through vigilant
antitrust enforcement where appropriate.
For example, one health care area the Task Force and its
members continue to challenge, where appropriate, is health care
mergers. Most of these challenges have been targeted toward hospital
mergers or purported joint ventures, which means that because of the
local markets involved, the proposed transaction will be challenged
only by the individual attorney general whose state contains the
hospital affected by the merger. The two most recent hospital
challenges brought by state attorneys general, California v. Sutter
Health System 27 and New York v. Saint Francis Hospital28 ended in
opposite results, but nonetheless demonstrate the commitment of
state attorneys general to preserving competition in this industry
wherever possible.
In Sutter Health, California challenged a proposed hospital
merger in the San Francisco bay area, after the FTC passed on
challenging the transaction. 29 The California Attorney General did
not agree with the FTC that the proposed merger would not result in
adverse effects on competition in the bay area's local hospital
market.3 ( The court, however, declined to ejoin the proposed
merger,3' and the ruling was upheld on appeal. Subsequently, the
27 California v. Sutter Health Sys., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd
mem, 217 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2000) (opinion not for publication), available at 2000
WL 531847, opinion after remand, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
28 New York v. Saint Francis Hosp., 94 F. Supp. 2d 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
29 Sutter Health, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 1066.
30 id.
"' Id. at 1086.
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merger was consummated.
In Saint Francis Hospital, the New York Attorney General's
Office challenged a purported joint operating agreement between two
hospitals engaging in joint negotiation of contracts and allocation of
services, contending that the agreement constituted price-fixing. The
DOJ had earlier declined to pursue the case, concluding that the
proposed arrangement would not produce significant anticompetitive
effects. This time, the court sided with the state attorney general and
enjoined the joint operating agreement.33
While one challenge was successful and one was not, what is
important is that the state attorneys general involved felt compelled
by the circumstances, including the decision of the federal
enforcement agencies not to act, to pursue the challenges to ensure a
competitive marketplace. As can be seen from the opposite results in
the two cases, states win and they lose. Regardless of the outcome,
however, the key is that the attorneys general took action when they
thought it right to do so.
Many state attorneys general continue to be confronted with
the efforts of the American Medical Association ("AMA") and their
state counterparts to obtain state legislation that would permit
physicians to collectively negotiate with third party health care
payors supposedly without running afoul of the antitrust laws. Some
state attorneys general have successfully turned back similar
proposed legislation in recent years, arguing that bills that attempt to
immunize such negotiations from the application of the antitrust laws
have an adverse effect on competition. However, various iterations of
this proposed legislation have been enacted in at least four states.
34
Most recently, despite strong objections from the Attorney General of
Alaska and the FTC, the Alaska legislature became the latest of these
four states to enact such legislation.35
Despite these setbacks, the Task Force continues to assist
states wherever possible to thwart efforts of the AMA and others
32 Sutter Health, 217 F.3d at 846 (opinion not for publication), available at
2000 WL 531847.
33 New York v. Saint Francis Hospital, No. 98 Civ. 939 (WCC) (S.D. N.Y.
June 30, 2000), Final Consent Judgment available at http://www.abanet.org
/antitrust/committeesstate-antitrust/taxol settlement.pdf.
34 See, e.g., Ch. 29 TEX. INS. CODE § 29.01, et seq. (2003); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 43.72.310 (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:17B-196 (2003); ALASKA STAT. §
23.50.010 (2003).
35 ALASKA STAT. § 23.50.010 (2003).
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attempting to establish unprecedented antitrust immunity for
physicians. The Task Force also intends to weigh in, as necessary, on
any similar legislative effort at the federal level.
Finally, it is important to mention that state attorneys general
are also regularly involved in reviewing proposed hospital
conversions. 36 Conversions of hospitals from not-for-profit to for-
profit hospitals may not give rise to antitrust concerns, but can
concern state attorneys general nonetheless where community assets
invested in the not-for-profit establishment may potentially end up
being absorbed into the for-profit as a result of the conversion to the
detriment of the community and its citizens who made the original
and ongoing investments. Many state attorneys general have the
statutory authority to review such transactions to ensure that the
community investment is either protected or adequately redressed,
and they routinely exercise this authority wherever it appears
appropriate to do so. 7
B. The Pharmaceutical Industry
Over the last five years in particular, state attorneys general
have also made challenging abuses within the pharmaceuticals
industry a primary enforcement initiative. Since January 2003, state
attorneys general have announced three major settlements with
pharmaceutical companies, totaling $235 million.
First, in January, all fifty states settled New York v. Aventis
S.A. on behalf of affected consumers and public entities as part of
an $80 million settlement to benefit all end users. The settlement
resolved allegations that Aventis, the branded maker of a certain
heart medication, unlawfully extended its patent for the drug by
agreeing to pay a generic company to delay entry of its generic
equivalent. This delay allowed Aventis to continue to charge
monopoly prices for its heart drug when, had the generic company
entered the market when originally intended, Aventis would have had
to price its drug more competitively. As a result, those who
purchased heart medication, while the agreement was in place, paid
more for the medication than they would have had generic
36 See, e.g., Florida v. Catholic Health East, et al., No., CL 01-0068 AB (15th
Jud. Cir., Palm Beach County, 2001).
37 See, e.g., 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/9; CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12598
(2003).
38 New York v. Aventis S.A., MDL No. 1278, No. 01-CV-71835 (NGE) (E.D.
Mich. Jan. 29, 2003).
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competition been present. The terms of the settlement permit eligible
purchasers of the drug, Cardizem CD, to make claims to recover any
overcharges they may have paid as a result of the unlawful
agreement.
Then, in February 2003, all fifty states settled Alabama v.
Bristol-Myers Squibb, for $100 million on behalf of consumers and
public entities.39 The states had alleged that Bristol-Myers Squibb
had attempted to extend an unlawful monopoly over the market for
BuSpar tablets, an anti-anxiety medication, by fraudulently exploiting
federal patent and drug laws.4 0 The unlawful extension of the patent
resulted in delaying the entry of generic competition which kept the
price for BuSpar higher than it would have been had competition
existed from generic equivalents. Consequently, purchasers of the
anti-anxiety drug paid more than they otherwise would have. As a
result of the settlement, eligible individuals who purchased BuSpar
during the period when there should have been generic drug
alternatives available at lower prices may file claims to recover their
overcharges.
Finally, in April 2003, all fifty states finalized a settlement in
Ohio v. Bristol-Myers Squibb.41 That case tentatively settled for $55
million and resolved allegations that Bristol-Myers Squibb attempted
to extend its unlawful monopoly over the market for the breast cancer
drug Taxol, by once again manipulating the patent process and
fraudulently securing patents that had no legal validity. The effect on
consumers was similar to the BuSpar case, with patients and public
health facilities paying more for Taxol than would have been the case
had the patent been allowed to expire lawfully. The settlement
provides an opportunity for purchasers of the drug during the time the
patent was unlawfully extended to make claims for any overcharges
they may have paid.
As long as the Task Force is able to detect potential violations
of the antitrust laws in the pharmaceuticals industry, state attorneys
general will continue to make their efforts in this area an important
enforcement priority.
39 Alabama v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, MDL Nos. 1410 & 1413, No. 01-Civ.
11401 (JGK) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7,2003).
40 id.
41 Ohio v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, Civ. No. 2:02 CV 01080 (EGS) (D.D.C. Apr.
24, 2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/committees/state-
antitrust/taxol settlement.pdf.
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C. Telecommunications Industry
A third trend in state antitrust enforcement has been in the
telecommunications area. Like hospitals, the telecommunications
industry often operates within small local markets and is an industry
in which quality of service, consumer choice, and competitive pricing
are important to consumers. As a result, state attorneys general have
made it a priority to address increasing market concentration in this
industry as well as other issues affecting competition. Over the last
two years, there have been multistate reviews of four proposed
mergers of telecommunications conglomerates: (1) Echostar
Communications Corporation and Hughes Electronics Corporation
("DirectTV'); (2) AT&T Broadband Corporation and Comcast
Corporation; (3) Hispanic Broadcasting Corporation and Univision
Communications, Incorporated; and (4) News Corporation and
DirectTV.
Of these, the merger of biggest concern was Echostar and
DirectTV because once the companies merged, there would be no
viable satellite dish companies remaining to provide competition.
After considerable review, twenty-three states and the DOJ jointly
challenged the proposed merger. In late 2002, as a result of the
filing of the joint state-federal complaint, Echostar and DirectTV
decided to abandon their effort. The result for consumers is that they
continue to have two viable choices in satellite dish technology,
service, and product offerings.
In addition to undertaking merger challenges, state attorneys
general have also submitted amicus curiae briefs in
telecommunications matters where competition, or the lack thereof,
has been an issue. Earlier this year, several state attorneys general
filed amicus curiae briefs in Covad Communications v. Bell Atlantic
Corp., currently pending in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. 43 The
states argued in support of Covad that the obligations placed upon
incumbent local telephone companies by the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 ("Telecom Act")" do not preclude competitors from
42 Complaint, United States v. Echostar Communications Corp. (D.D.C. Oct.
31, 2002) (No. 02-CV-2138), available at http://www.usdoj.gov
/atr/cases/f200400/200409/pdf.
43 Covad Communications v. Bell Atlantic Corp. (D.C. Cir.) (No. 02-7057)
(pending review).
44 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1996)).
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seeking relief under the antitrust laws.45 The primary rationale behind
the states' position is that the Telecom Act contains an express
antitrust savings clause and that clause, in addition to the absence of
any clear conflict between the antitrust laws and the regulatory
system established by the Act, means there was no intent to effect an
implied repeal of the antitrust laws where the failure to fulfill certain
46
obligations under the Act may also constitute an antitrust violation.
This case is important to consumers because the continued
application of the antitrust laws to telecommunications companies, as
they are gradually deregulated pursuant to the Telecom Act, will
ensure an avenue to redress potential anticompetitive conduct
designed to preserve existing monopolies despite the intent behind
the Act to establish competition in local telephone markets.47
More recently, the state attorneys general have split in their
support of the parties in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices
of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., recently accepted for certiorari by the
United States Supreme Court.48 Thirteen states and two territories
submitted an amicus curiae brief in support of Trinko while eight
states filed an amicus curiae brief in support of Verizon. At issue is
the Second Circuit's holding which affirmed Trinko's standing to sue
Verizon under the Telecom Act and determined that Trinko could
pursue the case under either of two particular antitrust theories,
monopoly leveraging or essential facilities.49 The states' divergent
views primarily stem from whether the facts presented in Trinko
provide an adequate basis for a monopoly leveraging or essential
facilities theory in light of the obligations imposed by the Telecom
Act upon incumbent local phone companies.5 °
While it is unusual that state attorneys general take opposing
45 Brief of Amicus Curiae States in Support of Covad Communications, Covad
Communications v. Bell Atlantic Corp. (D.C. Cir.) (No. 02-7057), available at
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/committees/state-antitrust/advocacy.html#acb.
46 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 601, 110 Stat.
56 (reproduced in note to 47 U.S.C. § 152 (1996)).
47 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 1 (1996) (noting that a primary purpose of
the Telecom Act is to open all telecommunications markets to competition).
48 Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 305 F.3d 89
(2d Cir. 2002), cert. granted mem. sub. nom. Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 123 S. Ct. 1480 (2003) (No. 02-682).
49 Bell Atlantic Corp., 305 F.3d at 108-09.
50 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 § U.S.C. 151 (1996)).
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positions, it does happen on occasion, just as it sometimes happens
that the FTC and DOJ do not agree on whether particular antitrust
theories may be viably pursued. The Trinko situation demonstrates
how difficult it sometimes is to parse through antitrust analysis and
that divergent views among plaintiffs may be the result. The fact that
state attorneys general have weighed in on either side of the debate in
Trinko lends support to the overarching view that the more
opportunities there are for antitrust law to be developed, the more
likely that uncertainties in antitrust jurisprudence will be resolved
quickly. This will eventually result in a more consistent application
of the antitrust laws in future cases.
Because the health care, pharmaceutical, and
telecommunications industries are rapidly changing and directly
impact consumers in their everyday lives, state attorneys general will
continue to devote a significant portion of their enforcement efforts to
these industries. These efforts will ensure that consumers of the
products and services provided by these industries will continue to
reap the benefits of the evolving competition they are experiencing.
D. Price-fixing Cases: The "Meat and Potatoes" of State
Antitrust Enforcement
Up to this point, the enforcement priorities of state attorneys
general have been discussed in terms of the focus of attorneys general
on particular industries, but regardless of the industry under scrutiny,
the core enforcement priorities of state attorneys general over the last
twenty years have typically focused on three specific types of
antitrust cases: (1) price-fixing, in particular, bid-rigging cases; (2)
indirect purchaser cases; and (3) vertical restraints. Each of these
enforcement priorities is important because each significantly
impacts consumers and state and local public entities and, more
important, these are cases that are rarely pursued by federal
enforcement authorities. For example, bid-rigging cases are usually
local in nature and, as a result, the federal agencies expect state
attorneys general will pursue such cases. With respect to indirect
purchaser cases, the federal enforcement agencies either do not
exercise their jurisdiction or have no jurisdiction to represent
consumers or public entities that are indirect purchasers of price-
fixed products. Many state attorneys general do have such authority
under their state laws.51 Finally, with respect to vertical restraints, the
federal agencies rarely pursue these kinds of price-fixing cases,
51 See supra text accompanying note 25.
[Vol. 16: 1
State Antitrust Enforcement
which means that government enforcement in this area is left almost
entirely in the hands of state attorneys general.
Price-fixing, given its pernicious nature, has always been and
will continue to be a focus of state antitrust enforcement. Over the
years, state attorneys general have pursued price-fixing conspiracy
cases, both tacit and express, involving a number of products,
including, school milk, water treatment chemicals, shoes, farm
chemicals, infant formula products, cement products, compact disks,
collectible stamps, tour bus operations, and retail gasoline, to name a
few. Price-fixing conspiracies can either be horizontal, between
competitors, or vertical, between a manufacturer and a retailer. In the
area of horizontal price-fixing conspiracies, the most recent efforts by
state attorneys general have involved bid-rigging conspiracies, one of
the most egregious forms of horizontal price-fixing.
1. Bid-Rigging Conspiracies
Most bid-rigging conspiracies, by their very nature, are
typically going to be limited to a particular state or local market. As a
result, these cases are not only cases that the federal agencies likely
will not review but also cases that will not be large enough to involve
more than one state attorney general. This fact makes it all the more
imperative that state attorneys general make the detection and
prosecution of bid-rigging cases an ongoing enforcement priority, as
they likely constitute the first and last deterrent with respect to such
conduct.
One of the most recent bid-rigging cases comes out of
Florida, Florida v. Saul & Co., which involved bid-rigging at a tax
certificate auction in Lee County, Florida, in 1998.52 Several bidders
allegedly conspired to allocate bids during the auction so as to insure
that each bidder secured tax-delinquent properties at higher interest
rates than would have been obtained had the bidding actually been
competitive. 53 The twenty-two companies involved in the alleged
conspiracy settled in 2002 for nearly $800,000. The settlement
monies have been used to reimburse those property owners who paid
the price-fixed interest rates when they redeemed their tax
certificates. Any unclaimed funds were slated for distribution to
various Lee County area charities for housing-related programs.
52 See Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Florida ex rel. Butterworth v.
Saul & Co. (Fla. Lee County Ct. filed May 23, 2002) (No. 02-5768), available at
http://www.myfloridalegal.com/taxcerts.pdf.
53 Id.
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This case and others like it are important reminders to
companies that engage in competitive bidding of government
contracts that they must avoid communications with competitors
regarding bidding and pricing. Procurement officials increasingly are
trained to spot potential bid-rigging conduct and are reporting
suspicious conduct to their state attorney general to investigate. That
is how the Florida Attorney General's Office became aware of the
Lee County scheme.
Another recent bid-rigging case is New York v. Feldman.54 In
2001, New York, Maryland, and California sued eight individual
stamp dealers and two corporations in a federal civil court action,
alleging a bid rigging conspiracy involvin§ auctions for collectible
postage stamps over a twenty-year period. While the case is still
pending, no matter what its outcome, it represents another excellent
example of multistate coordination in antitrust enforcement. Three
separate state attorneys general coordinated their investigative and
litigation efforts and jointly sued to obtain the appropriate relief.
Additionally, this case is an example of a bid-rigging case brought by
state attorneys general in a private auction situation. Most bid-rigging
cases involve government auctions or government procurement
contracts. However, when consumers or public entities are directly
affected by the rigging of bids or auctions conducted by private
entities, this case demonstrates that state attorneys general will act as
necessary to secure the appropriate relief by those consumers who
were harmed by the alleged unlawful conduct.
2. Indirect Purchaser Cases
In addition to bid-rigging schemes, price-fixing that affects
indirect purchasers remains a focus of state antitrust enforcers. Ever
since the seminal case of California v. ARC America,56 state attorneys
general have endeavored to represent their consumers as indirect
purchasers in state and federal antitrust actions.
The most important recent case in which state attorneys
general represented consumers as indirect purchasers actually was not
a price-fixing case; it was a monopolization case. But, the result in
the case was so substantial it nonetheless requires mentioning as an
example of what state attorneys general are currently doing on behalf
54 New York v. Feldman, No. 01-CIV-6691 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 23, 2001)
(pending).
" See id.
56 California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989)
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of consumers as indirect purchasers. The case is Connecticut v.
Mylan Laboratories,57 which settled in 2001 for $100 million. In that
case, the states, on behalf of consumers and state and local public
entities, alleged that Mylan had unlawfully monopolized the market
for the active ingredient in two of its anti-anxiety drugs by entering
into exclusive agreements with the only suppliers of this ingredient.
The consumer fund portion of the settlement, approximately $72
million was distributed in 2002 following an extensive notice
program and claims process. Affected consumers who filed valid
claims received full reimbursement of their overcharges, a
tremendous result by any measure. Unclaimed consumer funds went
to governmental and not-for-profit mental health programs under
terms approved by the district court.
3. Vertical Price-Fixing
Finally, state attorneys general continue, as they have for the
last two decades, to pursue vertical price-fixing cases. Vertical price-
fixing occurs when firms at different levels of distribution agree to
fix prices at one or both levels at a set amount or within a prescribed
range. Indeed, this is an area that has been almost entirely relegated
to state enforcers, as the federal enforcement agencies have rarely
brought cases in this area.
In the last year, state attorneys general have settled two
vertical price-fixing cases. First, in September 2002, forty-seven
states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico settled a minimum
resale price maintenance case against Salton Corporation, the maker
of the popular George Foreman indoor contact grills, for nearly $8
million.59 The settlement resolved allegations that Salton had coerced
retailers, who had been discounting the retail price of the grills in
agreeing to increase their prices or having the sale of the grills to
them suspended in violation of Salton's resale pricing policy. This
conduct, known as "minimum resale price maintenance" constitutes
vertical price-fixing and is therefore unlawful. In addition to paying
57 Connecticut v. Mylan Lab., No. 1:98 CV 03115 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 22,
1998), settlement approved sub nom. In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust
Litigation, 205 F.R.D. 369, 402 (D.D.C. Feb. 1, 2002), available at
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/committees/state-antitrust/mylan.pdf.
58 id.
59 New York v. Salton, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d 310, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2002),
settlement agreement available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/committees/
state-antitrust/saltonsettle.pdf.
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the settlement sum, Salton agreed to cease enforcing its unlawful
pricing policy.
Later, in September 2002, forty states and the District of
Columbia settled In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price
Antitrust Litigation against the five maior distributors of compact
discs and certain traditional CD retailers.6° The states alleged that the
distributors and retailers had conspired to impose ever-more stringent
minimum advertising pricing ("MAP") policies, resulting in higher
CD prices at retail than would normally exist in a purely competitive
retail environment. The case settled for $142 million, $75 million of
which is to be distributed to schools, libraries and other charitable
institutions in the form of free compact discs and $67 million in cash
to go to eligible consumers. Consumers are eligible if they purchased
one or more CDs during the period the MAP policies were in effect.
The amount of money each consumer ultimately will receive as part
of the settlement depends upon the total, number of eligible claims
received.
The four price-fixing cases described in this section,
involving four distinct products or services, illustrate that price-fixing
remains a significant problem. As such, the aggressive pursuit of
horizontal and vertical price-fixing cases, including bid-rigging and
vertical restraint agreements, must continue to be a key enforcement
priority for state attorneys general. Likewise, state attorneys general
must also continue to make the recovery of overcharges for
consumers and public entities that are indirect purchasers of a price-
fixed or unlawfully monopolized product or service an enforcement
priority. This is especially important when federal enforcement
agencies either do not have jurisdiction or choose not to exercise it
with respect to these areas. In these instances, state attorneys general
play a very important role in ensuring that consumers and public
entities are properly redressed for antitrust violations that would
otherwise go unchallenged.
IV. Multistate Antitrust Task Force Structure,
Functions and Approach
To appreciate how the enforcement priorities just discussed
are practically pursued through the Task Force, it is important to
understand how the Task Force is structured, its particular functions,
60 In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litigation, MDL
No. 1361, 2003 WL 21685581 (D. Me. July 18, 2003), settlement available at
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/committees/state-antitrust/cd-order.pdf.
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and the manner in which the Task Force typically undertakes a
multistate investigation or litigation.
The structure of the Task Force is uniquely different from its
federal antitrust enforcement agency counterparts. The DOJ
Antitrust Division is headed up by an Assistant Attorney General
who reports to the United States Attorney General. While it does
have civil non-merger enforcement authority, the DOJ primarily
pursues criminal antitrust violations, including international cartels,
and conducts civil merger enforcement. The remedies typically
available to the DOJ in a non-merger case are criminal fines, jail
terms, and equitable relief, usually in the form of an injunction. The
DOJ has no jurisdiction to recover damages on behalf of consumers
or state and local public entities.
The FTC has a chair and four other commissioners, who are
charged with, among other things, enforcing Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.61 The FTC typically takes on various civil
enforcement merger and non-merger matters and may seek equitable
remedies such as injunctions and, in some cases, disgorgement or
restitution. However, the FTC has no authority to represent
consumers or state and local public entities to recover damages
incurred by them.
62
By contrast, the Task Force is comprised of fifty-six different
sovereign jurisdictions, all with different laws and procedures. But
the state attorneys general all have a few key things in common. First,
they are their state's chief legal officer, charged with protecting the
interests of its consumers and public entities. Second, largely because
of the role they play in their states, they all have been given the
express authority by Congress to represent natural persons and
recover monetary damages for violations of federal antitrust laws.
63
Likewise, they all may seek injunctive relief under these laws as
well. 64 Finally, they nearly all have in place state antitrust
enforcement offices that provide the resources the Task Force needs
61 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 41, 45 (West 2003).
62 While numerous district courts have permitted the FTC to pursue monetary
relief under Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTCA"), see,
e.g., FTC v. Mylan Lab., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25, 36-37 (D.D.C. 1999); and FTC v. Gem
Merchandising, 87 F.3d 460, 470 (1 1th Cir. 1996), these decisions are limited to
awarding monetary relief as a form of equitable ancillary relief. There is no
provision in the FTCA that gives the FTC the authority to seek damages on behalf
of consumers or public entities.
63 15 U.S.C.A. § 15 (West 2003).
64 15 U.S.C.A. § 26 (West 2003).
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to coordinate and effectively pursue antitrust investigations and
litigation.
A. The Multistate Task Force Structure
The Task Force was established in 1983, in conjunction with
the NAAG Antitrust Committee "to improve, enhance, and
coordinate state antitrust enforcement." 65 The Task Force has four
major functions: (1) to facilitate the multistate investigative and
litigation process; (2) to facilitate the state attorneys general
participation as amicus curiae in antitrust matters where appropriate;
(3) to suggest or comment upon legislation for Congress and state
legislatures; and (4) to develop policy positions on antitrust issues.
The Task Force is headed by a chair and vice chair, who are
selected by the Convener of the NAAG Antitrust Committee. There
are also four regional vice chairs for the Northeast, West, Mid-West,
and Southeast, who are charged with four responsibilities: (1)
facilitating the coordination of investigations and the prosecution of
cases with regional, but not national, implications; (2) establishing
and maintaining communications with the regional offices of the FTC
and DOJ located in their respective regions; (3) making action
recommendations to the Task Force regarding potential amicus
curiae opportunities or taking action on pending state or federal
legislation arising out of or affecting their respective regions; and (4)
recommending investigations to the Task Force that are appropriate
for either national enforcement or enforcement in other regions.
Additionally, there are also vice chairs in charge of amicus efforts,
policy and legislation, state and federal coordination, planning and
education, and litigation training. The remainder of the Task Force is
broken into three kinds of working groups: (1) industry working
groups; (2) litigation working groups; and (3) investigative working
groups. The industry working groups are permanent working groups
formed to facilitate the flow of formation and education and training
with respect to particular industries that historically have faced
consistent antitrust scrutiny. Presently, these industry working groups
include: telecommunications, airlines, health care, petroleum
products, energy, banking, payment systems, and pharmaceuticals.
The litigation working groups and investigative working groups are
established as new cases are developed and filed.
65 Michael F. Brockmeyer, Report from the National Association of Attorneys
General - State Antitrust Enforcement Programs: Report on the NAAG Multi-State
Task Force, 58 Antitrust L.J. 215, 216 n.3 (1989).
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Multistate cases generally begin with just a few states. Once
the case appears to be one having multistate implications, the states
that initiated the matter will propose a multistate working group and
typically offer to chair and organize the group. This working group,
once established, will coordinate the issuance of subpoenas or civil
investigative demands ("CIDs"), the receipt and review of CID
documents and other material, and the retention of experts to help
hone issues and establish possible liability and damage theories.
Meetings with opposing counsel, witness interviews, and the drafting
and filing of a proposed multistate complaint are generally
coordinated through the working group.
Given the multistate aspect of the investigation, subpoena or
CID recipients often ask for confidentiality agreements restricting
disclosure of material provided. States have become quite adept at
coordinating among themselves while still ensuring the
confidentiality of materials provided in response to a particular
state's subpoena.
Most states have provisions in their own law that permit them
to maintain the confidentiality of any materials deemed confidential
by another state. 66 If there is any doubt as to whether material can be
kept confidential by a particular state, the state seeking to obtain
access to confidential material will simply resort to its own
compulsory process to obtain the material, while still ensuring
maximum confidentiality protection for the producing party
consistent with both its investigative obligations and any state public
records laws.
If litigation appears the likely result of a multistate
investigation, a complaint will be circulated for comment to all the
working group states. In fact, in most instances, all fifty states, the
District of Columbia, and the five territories, will be given an
opportunity to review and sign on to the complaint. Multistate
complaints are typically a single document filed in a federal district
court setting forth both federal and state-specific antitrust claims.
However, there are instances where states have filed separate
complaints in state court and coordinated their cases in parallel
fashion. Of course, this is not the preferred approach since it is not as
efficient as the federal court approach.
Once suit is filed, the states run the litigation through a
committee structure with an executive committee, which oversees the
day-to-day case developments and interacts with opposing counsel
and the court, and other committees focusing on such things as
66 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 501.2065 (2002).
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discovery, experts, and settlement.
B. State and Federal Enforcement
As noted above, there are instances where the states will
pursue a matter that the federal government is also reviewing. In the
civil non-merger context, the FTC may be looking at obtaining strong
equitable relief. The states, on the other hand, are seeking to recover
damages and injunctive relief on behalf of consumers and state and
local public entities. Additionally, although the DOJ primarily
focuses on criminal antitrust enforcement, the states again may
pursue the same companies on behalf of their consumers and public
entities to recover any monetary damages or obtain any injunctive
relief warranted by the circumstances. So, although the federal
agencies may be reviewing a case also being reviewed by the states,
it is almost always for the purpose of obtaining different remedies on
behalf of different constituencies.
One area of enforcement that does overlap between the state
and federal enforcers, in the sense that the same remedies may be
sought by both state and federal enforcers, is civil merger
enforcement. This is because most mergers are sizable enough in
terms of the value of the combined assets to trigger federal antitrust
review, yet they also have state and local market implications that
raise concerns about the impact of competition at the state level.
Although there exists a written protocol 67 agreed upon by the federal
agencies and the state attorneys general regarding the procedures and
practices to be undertaken to effectively coordinate a state-federal
merger review, both the federal agencies and the states agree that
there is always room for improvement. Therefore, the Task Force
continues to work with the federal agencies to improve upon
federal-state coordination and cooperation in the civil merger review
context.
C. The Task Force and the Multistate Investigative Process
There are several criteria that generally dictate whether a state
or states will choose to pursue an antitrust matter:
(1) Does the matter have a local or regional impact upon
67Antitrust Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Protocol For Coordination In Merger
Investigations Between The Federal Enforcement Agencies And State Attorneys
General (1998) published in 1998-4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) &13, 420, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/l1773.wpd.
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the state's consumers or economy?
(2) Does the matter affect the public interest?
(3) Are state or local governmental agencies impacted?
(4) Can consumers directly or indirectly benefit from state
enforcement regarding this matter?
(5) Is the matter already being adequately addressed by the
federal antitrust agencies or private plaintiffs? If so, has
adequate injunctive relief been obtained?
(6) Is it the right thing to do?
Under these criteria, the primary focus of the state attorneys general
is to recover damages on behalf of consumers and state and local
public entities, especially in instances where there is not the
possibility of recovery through other avenues.
Although seeking monetary relief and strong injunctive relief
is the primary focus for the states when pursuing violations under the
federal antitrust laws, it must not be forgotten that many states also
have the ability to seek and obtain additional relief in either state
court, or in some instances, as supplemental claims in federal court.
These options may also dictate whether states will get involved in an
antitrust matter. For example, many state statutes allow for civil
penalties, restitution, and disgorgement. 68 Some states even have
debarment from selling to the state as a remedy.69 If a company is
found in violation of state or federal antitrust laws, it may be
removed from the state's vendor list and prohibited from doing
business with state and local agencies. Finally, most states also have
the ability to prosecute antitrust violations criminally. v
68 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 542.21 (2003) (civil penalties); COLO. REV. STAT. §
6-4-112 (2003) (civil penalties).
69 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 34.255, 34.257 (2003); MD. CODE ANN.,
STATE FIN. & PRoc., § 16-203 (West 2002); WIs. STAT. § 133.12 (2002); FLA.
STAT. § 287.132-33 (2003).
70 Forty-seven states have some form of criminal penalty for at least some
violations of state antitrust laws. Only Connecticut, Washington, and North Dakota
have no state criminal antitrust jurisdiction.
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So, while the Task Force structure, functions, and approach to
enforcement are unique to government enforcement, its efforts have
been no less effective than its federal agency counterparts. The very
nature of the structure of the Task Force, however, and the fact that
the Task Force is not a single enforcement entity, but is made up of
multiple jurisdictions with different laws and different enforcement
capabilities, has caused more than a little confusion for the defense
bar over the years. This confusion, however, is often largely the result
of neither knowing nor appreciating that the state attorneys general
do generally work together through an organized structure, the Task
Force, to coordinate their multistate enforcement efforts and to avoid
duplication of those efforts. Consequently, it pays for defense counsel
to take the time to learn about the Task Force and how it works. At
the very least, defense counsel should be aware that the working
group is generally the format adopted by state attorneys general to
coordinate a civil merger or non-merger investigation and that there
are typically one or two lead states that head up a working group.
Once *that basic premise is understood, it should be easier for defense
counsel interested in coordinating or cooperating with the multistate
investigation to do so more efficiently and effectively. Of course,
there are always other factors to consider when confronted with a
state or multistate investigation.
V. Practice Pointers for Defense Counsel in Multistate
Investigations
Given the background, structure, focus, and priorities of the
Task Force described above, how best does antitrust counsel go about
dealing with a state or multistate investigation? Generally, there are
three fairly constant factors to always keep in mind with respect to
any multistate situation:
First, it never hurts to open the doors of communication early
to discuss the issues and facts with the lead states in the working
group. Whether an investigation or litigation, merger or non-merger,
antitrust issues are rarely black and white. Having a candid
discussion as early as practicable about the strengths and weaknesses
of the case is always productive for both sides. Conversely, to ignore
the state attorneys general may have significant and costly
repercussions for your client.
Also, keep in mind that, in most cases, the state attorney
general is representing either consumers or public entities and
seeking damages or restitution and injunctive relief on their behalf. If
the damages do not appear significant or injunctive relief has become
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moot for whatever reason, then these are good reasons not to go
forward with an investigation and litigation, and states may be
persuaded that it is not a case in which to devote limited resources.
Finally, never assume that state attorneys general will not be
interested in a matter already being handled by the federal agencies
or private bar. The state attorneys general may be interested in
seeking relief in addition to that being pursued by the federal
agencies or the private bar and on behalf of individuals or entities
whose interests are not being represented by others. Consequently, it
is important not to overlook state attorneys general during the
investigative phase, even where other agencies or plaintiffs are
already pursuing the matter, especially if your client is interested in
resolving any inquiry quickly.
Those are a few general pointers to consider for attorneys
representing clients in potential multistate antitrust matters. They are
not the only factors to consider, but they are generally the key things
to consider when faced with any state or multistate civil merger or
non-merger review. If these simple suggestions are followed, defense
counsel will at least be better informed regarding the investigation
and its potential as well as the options he likely has available to him,
and, in turn, he can better represent his client.
VI. Conclusion
The Task Force is not a single entity and its success depends
largely on the ability of its individual members to coordinate their
efforts towards achieving common goals. Therefore, it has become
clear to those who participate in the Task Force that this seemingly
amorphous structure has given rise to significant misperceptions.
There is an assumption, for example, that when state attorneys
general become involved in a matter, a client must be concerned with
dealing with each of them individually. There is an assumption that
state attorneys general never originate their own cases and merely
duplicate the federal enforcement effort, and as a corollary, there is
the assumption that state attorneys general do not focus on matters of
local and state significance and in particular, of significance to their
consumers.
While this article is not intended to be a comprehensive
treatise on multistate antitrust enforcement, it demonstrates that these
assumptions are simply uninformed. The Task Force's success is
largely because of its individual members ability to coordinate
effectively and efficiently. Its working group structure works well for
both its members and for the defense counsel who work with them.
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Likewise, state attorneys general continue to pursue effectively cases,
many of which are originated by state attorneys general, with local
and regional market implications and, as a result, have managed to
recoup hundreds of millions of dollars for consumers and public
entities.
Finally, when state attorneys general do pursue cases also
being handled by the FTC or the DOJ, it is not typically to duplicate
the federal enforcement effort, but to effect their responsibility under
federal and state law to recover damages and obtain the appropriate
equitable relief on behalf of consumers and public entities who
otherwise may not be recompensed for the financial harm caused
them by the unlawful conduct. I would venture to guess that
consumers and public entities who have seen the direct benefit of
these efforts would likely disagree with those who suggest that state
attorneys general add nothing to antitrust enforcement. Whether
viewed as filling a gap in government antitrust enforcement or
blazing its own trail, state antitrust enforcement has had a significant
hand in shaping antitrust jurisprudence as well as the manner in
which the antitrust laws are enforced in this country. Competition and
consumers have unquestionably benefited as a result.
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